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Perspective and Spatiality in the Modern Age 
The Italian Painting and the Topos of Annunciation between 
Art, Theology and Science 
Fausto Fraisopi 
Genesis of Modern Age and Rise of Perspective belong one to another  
G. Bohem 
After the essay of Panofsky, Perspective as symbolic form, Perspective became a field of 
research, surpassing the domain of Art critique and becoming a philosophical argument. 
How can we think of Perspective as symbolic Form? Is Perspective really a symbolic 
form? Why is Perspective so important? Because at the beginning of the Modern Age, 
Perspective as a spiritual figure grounds many symbolic or even many scientific 
constructions. We could we say that perspective opens the foundation of modern 
science as such. The “Geometrization” of Vision, beginning with perspective, will be for 
us the interpretative key in order to understand the Modern Age as a whole. This 
understanding will allow us to understand the anthropologic dimension arising from the 
Modern Age, called “Perspectivism”1. 
The following enquiry will be articulated in three parts. Firstly I will consider 
Perspective in order to show how it must not only be considered as “symbolic” Form but 
it must be treated as “proto-symbolic Form” as well. Secondly, I will show, interpreting 
some paradigmatic cases, how the full anthropologic Revolution of the Renaissance will 
be “opened” and “started” by the constitution of Perspective as iconic tool. Thirdly, I will 
consider the essential outlines of Perspectivism. Perspectivism will appear, before all, as 
paradigmatic structure including Perspective, as well as modern science and philosophy. 
Perspectivism will emerge as something determining the self-interpretation of the 
modern man: a paradigmatic form of a well-determined approach to the world and to 
 
1
 See Boehm (1969): 11, and Thaliath (2005). 
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Phainomena2. The questions that determine such inquiry are nevertheless topical: is 
such Perspectivism still valid for the Self-Interpretation of Mankind? If not, under which 
conditions is it possible to consider the situation of mankind without perspective? Is 
possible for us thinking independently of a unique perspective? 
1. Perspective as proto-symbolic Form 
In his analysis of Perspective, Erwin Panofsky (1997: 28) affirms that Perspective has 
been the crucial factor for the “discovery” of the infinite in modern Mathematics as well 
as for the development of projective Geometry3. In this sense Perspective appears not 
only as an artistic moment, belonging to painting, but also as a laboratory for something 
more radical and essential. This “something” is the spatiality itself, as we conceive it as 
modern citizens, modern scientists and modern men. But what is properly to be 
understood as Perspective in the Modern Age? Roughly speaking, Perspective is that 
technique by which we can represent a three-dimensional space in a two-dimensional 
one, by maintaining all proportions4. 
How is it also possible that a “simple” technique can generate something more 
radical or more fundamental? How is it possible that Perspective opens the new horizon 
of the Modern Age and prepares, at the same time, its foundation? In this sense the 
definition of Perspective as “symbolic form” appears quite unsatisfying. Firstly 
Perspective does not appear as “symbolic” at all: on the contrary it appears as radically 
“mimetic”. Secondly, if we consider Perspective from the point of view of Cassirer’s 
theory of symbolic forms, Perspective is not a symbolic form5.  
Symbolic forms such as Myth, Art, Religion, Science, express not only things or 
 
2
 Thanks to Giuseppe Longo, friend and master, but firstly mathematician, epistemologist and 
historian of science, who introduced me, many years ago, to such perspective. See Longo, L’infini 
mathématique “in prospettiva” et les espaces des possibles. 
3
 See Boehm (1969): 13: «The evolution of projective Geometry put the old Doctrine of optical 
illusion aside. At the same time, Perspective as perspectiva artificialis becomes the center of the 
scientific determination of the new Art. As Perpsectivity, it takes place in the middle of 
philosophical thinking, wherein it newly characterizes the Way by which Man thinks of himself in 
the World».  
4
 See also “Perspective”, in Oxford English Dictionary, on-line edition, Oxford, 2007: «The art of 
drawing solid objects on a plane surface so as to give the same impression of relative position, 
size, or distance, as the actual objects do when viewed from a particular point». 
5
 Of the same opinion is Boehm (1969: 14): «Independently from many interesting and precise 
issues, the work cannot justify how Perspective can assume the role of an autonomous symbolic 
Form». 
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objects, but include «an autonomous energy of the spirit, by which the simple appearing 
thing receives a significance, an autonomous ideal content»6. Language, Myth, Ethics, 
Aesthetics and Religion are in Cassirer’s theory, «a-theoretical functions». Like science, 
they are «symbolic». How could we then consider Perspective as symbolic form, if it 
belongs to another symbolic form? Does one accept the symbolic Form “Art” as 
something like a subspecies? As Panofsky argues, to every Age belongs its own 
perspective. But why does Perspective appear to be crucial only since Renaissance? Such 
questions remain unanswered if we accept the simple definition of Perspective as 
symbolic form. But more questions arise: how should we understand the “symbolic” 
function of Perspective in the Renaissance as World-building form? Why does 
perspective perform such a crucial function in the Renaissance and not in other Ages? 
Our thesis is: Perspective is neither a symbolic Form in Cassirer’s Sense nor a simple 
historical formation or sub-species of a symbolic Form: Art. Perspective is something 
more7, it represents a crossroad. At this crossroad many exhausted symbolic forms of the 
Middle Ages meet and fuse. From this fusion something new will be formed and 
structured. Perspective presents itself as a breakpoint in the “order of discourse” of the 
Middle Ages. It’s matter of a meta-theoretic crossroads among Theology, Art and 
Science8. Only from the fusion of these great constellations of knowing can arise 
something so strong as the Idea of a World-Picture [Weltbild]. Perspective appears at 
that moment, when the idea of World as something to be captured by “mimesis” and 
description gives way to the idea of construction. The possibility of symbolic 
construction includes the “symbolic” activity of science. Such “symbolic” revolution 
includes all the historical Phenomena that Heidegger describes in The Age of the World 
Picture: science, machine technology, art as Aesthetics, human action as culture, and the 
loss of the gods [Entgötterung]9 all belong to this fundamental idea of construction10. But 
 
6
 Cassirer (2001): 7: «[scil. die symbolische Form ist etwas] das drückt nicht bloß ein Vorhandenes 
aus, sondern eine selbständige Energie des Geistes in sich schließt, durch die das schlichte Dasein 
der Erscheinung eine bestimmte “Bedeutung”, einen eigentümlichen ideellen Gehalt empfängt».  
7
 See Marion (1987: 17): «La perspective ne doit donc pas s’entendre d’abord ni surtout comme 
une théorie picturale historiquement située (bien qu’elle le soit aussi), mais comme l’office fon-
damental du regard, sans quoi nous ne verrions jamais un monde. Notre regard accède à un 
monde − exerce son être-au-monde − parce que la perspective, au sens de l’invisible ménageant 
le visible, a en propre de voir à travers le visible, donc selon l’invisible». 
8
 Boehm (1969): 13: «The subject-object correlation presents the polarized framework, by which 
non-cognitive Domains of Culture, Myth, Religion and Art can be determined». 
9
 See Heidegger (2002): 58. 
10
 For understanding the crucial role of the idea of “construction” in the Modern Age, see G. 
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at the beginning they have something essential to do with spatiality, i.e. with a particular 
conception of space.  
Following this new idea of spatiality, every being must be inscribed in an isomorphic, 
isotropic and homogeneous space. This is made possible precisely by reshaping the 
essence of experience as a cognitive (subject-object) relation. Now, such radical 
appearance of the cognitive relation, as implication of this new idea of spatiality, is the 
result of a long process that the Perspective precisely started and oriented towards its 
fulfillment. Independently from its aesthetic-historical relevance, the Perspective works 
essentially on the «phenomenality of phenomena» itself 11. Phenomena have to be 
inscribed in a sort of scene of the world. The world has become an endless world from 
many points of view: 
In the history of human kind, various epochs stand out in which the structure of reality has 
undergone clear changes. The question may be left open for now whether the basis for that 
structural change lay in a new insight, or whether that insight was only made possible by a 
change in the structure of reality itself. But we do sense a meaningful connection when we 
learn that three seemingly completely independent, yet inherently related, events took place 
in close temporal proximity roughly at the outset of the modern era: Columbus’ first voyage 
to America, Luther’s and Zwingli’s debate whether in the Eucharist the bread is the body of 
Christ or represents it, and Copernicus’ discoveries. (Heisenberg [1927-1955]: 18) 
We can isolate here three new forms of spatiality, which intersect and will be radically 
transformed: a sort of metaphysical spatiality, a sort of anthropological-geographical 
spatiality and a physical-mathematical one. These three forms converge to the point of 
fusion of the Galilean-Cartesian revolution, as the geometrization-algebraization of reality 
and as the first foundation of Perspectivism as anthropological and philosophical Paradigm.  
2. The anthropological and scientific Role of Perspective 
But how can such convergence really take place? An answer, first suggested by Panosky 
as marginal remark, is systematically articulated by Daniel Arasse (1999). In his Book 
L’annonciation italienne. Une histoire de perspective, Arasse considers the topos of 
Annunciation as iconographic Moment. Through Annunciation and its representation the 
theological metaphysical idea of infinity, that is to say the transcendent spatiality of 
God’s Will and God’s Power, came into the visible. It becomes a sort of visible element in 
 
Lachtermann (1969).  
11
 See Marion (1987): 19: «la perspective, au delà de son acception historiquement esthétique, 
travaille à la phénoménalité des phénomènes: par elle l’invisible du regard distend, dispose et 
manifeste le chaos du visible en phénomènes harmoniques». 
Fausto Fraisopi, Perspective and Spatiality in the Modern Age 
pag. 119 
© Firenze University Press • Aisthesis • 1/2016 • www.fupress.com/aisthesis • ISSN 2035-8466 
the scene of reality: the perspectival style of painting, precisely as geometric construction, 
made it possible for the immeasurable to become both measurable and visible.  
The Annunciation will be used as recurrent topos, by which the infinity will be 
painted, made visible. The question about the power of God and the actual infinity in 
reality arises in the condemnation of the theological averroistic Theses from Tampier, 
Bishop of Paris, in the year 1277. The condemnation suggests the possibility that the 
immediate action of God in the world is not inconsistent with the finite nature of the 
latter. Such condemnation opens a wide doctrinal way for theological theses 
demonstrating the possibility of the actual infinity in the world. As Zellini argues in his 
book A Brief History of Infinity, the Apeiron – since the Middle Age considered as an 
absurdity – will be inscribed in a history that bring us up to the Renaissance12.  
God, if he will, can show the infinity (as infinite power) also in our finite world. An 
example of this is the attribution of the full and infinite Grace – gratia plena atque infinita – 
even to a young Woman, Maria13. Such a strong 
theological thesis can help clarify the origins of 
the idea of infinity in the Modern Age. But how 
can a theological and iconographical topos, 
heterogeneous to every idea of geometrical 
space – basically the tale of a poor young woman 
and of an angel in a poor and dismissed house – 
represent the first radical phase of the 
construction of the modern idea of spatiality? 
Let’s consider, in chronological order, some 
(Italian) paintings. Firstly, the Annunciation of 
Ambrogio Lorenzetti, Siena, 1344. 
Panofsky argues that  
 
12
 Zellini (2005): 75. This interpretation became classical after P. Duhem. See Duhem (1984: 412): 
«S’il nous fallait assigner une date à la naissance de la Science moderne, nous choisirions sans 
doute cette année 1277 où l’évêque de Paris proclama solennellement qu’il pouvait exister 
plusieurs Mondes, et que l’ensemble des sphères célestes pouvait, sans contradiction, être animé 
d’un mouvement rectiligne». The validity of this assumption is contested in the contemporary 
research. See Grant (1974) and Piché (1999). 
13
 Gospel of Luke, 1, 26-38. 
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What makes a picture like Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s 
Annunciation of 1344 so important is, first of all, 
that the visible orthogonals of the ground plane are 
here for the first time all oriented toward a single 
point, undoubtedly with full mathematical 
consciousness; for the discovery of the vanishing 
point, as the “image of the infinitely distant points 
of all the orthogonals” is, in a sense, the concrete 
symbol for the discovery of the infinite itself14.  
It should be noted here that infinity is still to be 
considered as “potential” infinity. The 
orthogonals on the ground do not converge to an 
actual infinity. Only the convergence, i.e. the 
projection of a potential convergence, can show the infinity by a symbolic metaphor. 
Let’s consider now the Annunciation of Gentile da Fabriano, 1425. 
The small painting shows the construction of the same scene in the so-called Domus 
Mariae. Maria is sitting on a large bank, her hands humbly posed on the abdomen. Up to 
this point, it’s a classical scene in paintings. What changes? What is important here is the 
ray of light. Gentile da Fabriano paints the ray of light with a gold dust, going from the 
window down to Maria, symbolizing Grace itself. The infinity of the Power of God is 
materially, “materically” painted and embodied. The gold dust gives the idea of 
something stainless, free from any 
corruption, supernatural. The ray of 
light impresses itself in the body of 
Maria, but also in the body (that is 
in the matter) of the world. We find 
now a stronger symbolism, no 
longer only a projective “induction” 
to the actual infinity but a figure, 
through which such actual infinity 
will be presented and materialized. 
The infinity comes ichnographically 
into the space of the finite.  
 
14
 Panofsky (1997): 57. As Arasse (1999): 72 clearly argues, the Annunciation of Lorenzetti is a 
variation of an identical iconographic topos: how can we represent the arrival of the infinity in our 
finite world and not at the same time the “arrival” of the immeasurable in the measure?  
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Let us consider the Crivelli’s 
Annunciation with St. Emidius.15  
Here we find many dimensions or 
senses of the painting, but all are 
linked to the central rule of a 
perspectival construction. The 
painting depicts two different scenes 
from three points of view: we find two 
spatial situations, two historical 
moments and two political dimensions 
of life.  
In the spatial scene we experience 
two different spaces: the open space 
of the civil life (in the city) and the 
space of the private life (in the hortus 
conclusus wherein appear objects of 
domestic life, vegetables, fruits of the 
Domus Mariae). 
In the historical scene, we notice 
the Annunciation as classic topos (symbolized by the dove as iconic element) and the 
announcement of the political independence of the city, Ascoli, from the State of Church, 
the 25 March 1482 (symbolized by the carrier pigeon). 
In the political scene we recognize the dependence of the Virgin (as every Christian) 
upon the Will of God, and the independence of the City from (the will of) the Church. 
Gabriel, the Angel, is painted very laically as an Hermes with the inscription: “libertas 
ecclesiastica”. 
But what keeps together the duplicity of the scenes (or of the situations) is the 
trompe-l’oeil of the ray of light: it is geometrically impossible (and consequently 
impossible from the point of view of the perspective)16. It symbolizes precisely the sign 
of the actual infinity. The ray suspends the split in every scene in order to establish a 
unique one. The geometrical play shows, that the wonder is possible only for God.  
 
15
 See Arasse (1999): 188-194. 
16
 See Arasse (1999): 194: «Cette Annonciation constitue un cas exceptionnel de cette pratique où 
la logique perspective est contredite par la mise en place incongrue d’un ou plusieurs objets 
porteurs de la « grandiose invraisemblance du sacré».  
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The actual infinity comes ichnographically into the space of the visible, and makes of 
a split reality a unique world. Infinity is inscribed before ichonographically and only after 
geometrically into the realm of the visible. Such inscription can be valid for the infinitely 
small as well as for the infinitely great, as two asymptotes. Perspective is also the symbol 
of a radical translation, the translation of the infinity into the space. Thanks to this 
process of “translation” Galileo can explain to Simplicius in the Discourse that a sphere 
bases itself on an infinitely small point, crossed by endless lines. As Cassirer (1998: 70, 
Transl. mine) argues: «By Galilei the infinite becomes the principle of knowledge of every 
determination». 
Infinity is translated into the space as referring points of every viewer, because it’s 
precisely the point toward which the viewer orients his attention. This point takes place 
on the horizon, which provides unity to the representation and puts order among things 
as matter of vision17. And precisely by fixing the polarity between a viewer (as subject) 
and the vanishing point on the horizon, it’s possible to acknowledge the second crucial 
function of perspective: the homogenization and the relativization of space. The 
iconographic revolution of perspective consists precisely in denying the classical schema 
of medieval art: the vertical triangle structuring the space of painting. The vertical 
triangle, as symbol of an ontological well-ordered structure (and hierarchy) of the world, 




 See Boehm (1969): 23: «Now the space is conceived as homogeneous Multiplicity, 
corresponding to the actual infinity».  
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Leon Battista Alberti, in his treatise about paintings, argues: «I sketch a quadrangle, 
wherein I suppose to be an open window, through which I consider what is painted 
inside»18. We can rotate the visual pyramid as we wish by the variation or translation of 
the vanishing point of perspective, while the topologic principles structuring the space 
and the objects that are visible into this space still remain the same.  
In this sense the homogenization of space shows a new kind of openness to the 
world, that implies a corresponding homogenization of the objects. The objects are 
geometrically projected figures that are rooted in the logic of appearance. In other 
words: «the objects in the 
painting will be placed 
through construction in a 
space before introduced into 
the plan, that is three-
dimensional and unlimited, 
finding its end precisely at 
the line of horizon» (Boehm 
[1969]: 18. Transl. mine). 
 
18
 See Alberti (1435): 77. See also Panofsky (1997): 27: «We shall speak of a fully “perspectival” 
view of space not when mere isolated objects, such as houses or furniture, are represented in 
“foreshortening” but rather only when the entire picture has been transformed – to cite another 
Renaissance theoretician – into a “window” and when we are meant to believe we are looking 
through this window as a space». 
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In that sense the space itself is to be 
geometrized or, as Panofsky argues, postulated as 
homogeneous: «For the structure of an infinite, 
unchanging and homogeneous space – in short, a 
purely mathematical space – is quite unlike the 
structure of psychophysiological space»19. Its 
structure is homogenized and the reality – the 
phenomenal world – will be inscribed in pure 
geometric principles. Reality is also reduced to a 
formal-topological regularity. That will be clear by a 
simple analysis of the so-called Pala Brera of Piero 
della Francesca. This painting shows, more than 
others, how perspective represents a radical change 
of the 
theological 
spatiality and a radical change of the conception of 
space itself.  
Reality is geometrized, because the Geometric is 
the filigree of reality, it represents its framework, it 
determines the form and the character of every 
“objectity” [Gegenständlichkeit] appearing in such 
space. The Geometric [das Geometrische], as 
framework of reality, lies on the background of 
reality, where the “empeiria” cannot put its view. 
It’s what can be viewed or grasped only “sola 
mente”, just with our mind. As Piero della Francesca 
argues at the beginning of his treatise about 
perspective, De perspectiva pingendi, it’s matter of 
 
19
 Panofsky (1997): 29-30. Panofsky continues: «Perception does not know the concept of infinity; 
from the very outset it is confined within certain spatial limits imposed by our faculty of 
perception. And in connection with perceptual space we can no more speak of homogeneity than 
of infinity. The ultimate basis of homogeneity of geometric space is that all its elements, the 
“points” which are joined in it, are mere determinations of positions, possessing not independent 
content of their own outside of this relation, this position which they occupy in relation to each 
other. Their reality is exhausted in their reciprocal relation: it is a purely functional and not a 
substantial reality». 
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an intentional, technical (but nevertheless radical) abstraction20: «Colours will be so to 
speak desecrated»21. In other words: it’s matter of a reality “produced”, intentionally 
“constructed” by a spatial form, reduced to spatial forms. It’s precisely what Descartes 
argues in the fourteenth Regula ad directionem ingenii, where he clarifies the (new) 
sense of mathematical dimension: 
By “dimension” we understand nothing other than the mode and reason according to which 
some subject is considered to be measurable: so that not only length, width and depth are 
dimensions of body, but also gravity is a dimension according to which subjects are weighted, 
speed is a dimension of motion, and infinite others of the same kind22. 
Every dimension or rather every reality is measurable. The next step will now be the 
mathematization of geometry, because only in the field of mathematics is it possible to 
explain the visible and a geometrically reduced “image” in relation to infinity23.  
Mathematics is the science of infinity. And precisely such infinity is “something” that 
orders the geometric, reducing itself to mathematics. Merleau-Ponty (1993: 121) argues: 
«Science manipulates things and gives up living them». This second form of reduction 
takes place in the transition from a technique of construction of every geometric figure 
to the theory of handling with symbols: algebra. The symbolic transforms the geometric 
into the algebraic. Is not by chance that Descartes (1897-1913: 80) defines the new 
method of Wallis a «metaphysics of geometry». Thanks to the perspectival revolution 
and to the perspective itself as new form of technique, the vision will be constructed by 
rules and principles that are independent from every concrete reality of “empeiria”. The 
vision crosses over that reality for which can be described as an “inhabitation” of things, 
 
20
 Piero della Francesca (1480): 7: «We will consider the part of painting, that we can proof with 
Lines, Edges, Proportions, by speaking of Points, Lines, plans and bodies. This part contains five 
arguments: the first is seeing, i.e. the eye; the second is the form of seen thing; the third is the 
distance between eye and seen thing; the fourth are lines, going from the borders of the thing to 
the eye; the fifth is the space between eye and the seen thing» [Translation mine]. See also 
Martone (1985): 173-186. See Boehm (1969: 33): «the prevalence of the sketch (disegno) makes 
clear how the guarantee of being of the World-image will be given at first and that it builds up the 
Artwork». 
21
 See Held (2012): 38. 
22
 Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, AT X, (1897-1913): 447. 
23
 See Boehm (1969): 35: «Mathematics is the element that provides a stability of our grasping 
objects and the determination of the appearing as object will be led by such grasp. The object so 
mathematically determined is “first” in the proper sense of the word, he gets the character of 
stability. In the perspectival construction, as relation of the objectal space with the point of the 
eye, the intuition of the artist becomes owner of the stability of things». 
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of a dimension of natural places for things24. Only without “natural place” can we talk 
philosophically about Perspectivism, i.e. we can speak (and think) as if the subject could 
take every place in the world25. 
3. Perspectivisms 
The vision, as dioptric vision, now follows pure geometric-mathematic principles. 
Merleau-Ponty (1993: 275) argues: «Descartes’s Dioptrics is […] the breviary of a thought 
that wants no longer to abide in the visible and so decides to reconstruct it according to 
a model-in-thought». But what is most interesting is that by Descartes, geometry – what 
precisely “exhausts” reality – will be solved, reduced to a “grey Ontology”26, the ontology 
of “Perspectivity” (see Boehm [1969]: 88) or rather the ontology of the algebraic 
object27. Now it’s possible, on the horizon of infinity, to find infinity. But once more such 
infinity can only be grasped by an egological metaphysics, i.e. a metaphysics of the ego – 
in other words “sola mente”! The clear and distinct perception of such infinity belongs 
properly not to mathematics itself – because mathematics uses infinity only for symbolic 
calculations – but to a metaphysical enquiry.  
We need no deeper knowledge of the history of philosophy in order to be aware of a 
simple fact: the paradigmatic nature of perspective is deeply rooted in Descartes’s 
 
24
 See G. Boehm (1969): 76: «the perspectival structure of space, the construction of which is 
deeply related with the evolution of space in the Modern Age, as an infinite homogeneous space, 
does not suggest any possible reference to Aristotle’s Doctrine of Space, claiming the essential 
relation of the thing with its place».  
25
 Kaulbach (1990): 7: «the claim of modern man and citizen of a free construction of the world, is 
to be considered parallel with his liberation from the constrictions of a metaphysical world, that 
would blind him in a cosmic order». 
26
 For the concept of «ontologie grise», see Marion (1987b): 186: «ontologie grise, parce qu’elle 
ne se déclare point, et se dissimule dans un discours épistémologique. Mais surtout, parce qu’elle 
porte sur la chose, en tant qu’elle se laisse départir de son ousia irréductible, pour prendre le 
visage d’un objet, étant soumis entièrement aux exigences du savoir. De la chose à l’objet: la 
chose peut se définir comme ce qui, fondamentalement, fait question, soutient donc aussi sa 
propre cause à partir d’elle-même. L’ontologie grise, parce qu’elle maintient la chose dans la 
grisaille de l’objet, témoigne donc de la griserie (de l’hybris) de l’ego “maître et possesseur” du 
monde réduit à l’évidence». 
27
 See Boehm (1969): 33: «The problem is not to fix the relation between the object and its 
image. Image is for Descartes, as for the user of the perspectival method, only a sketch-
construction, that brings up the relation between spatial thing and image. Colors come after to 
colour the sketched tectonic, but coloring has no importance. Image consists in data, that will be 
distributed on the plan, and data contain all sufficient information for the construction of the 
things». 
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foundation of egology. But we have to go beyond a simple fascination, and consider how 
crucial are Kepler’s Paralipomena ad Vitellionem and Descartes’s Dioptrics for such 
inscription (or rather translation) of the visible into the thinkable (cogitabile). These two 
works open the “Golden Age” of projective and descriptive geometry, that extends itself 
to Euler and Monge (see Fraisopi [2009]: 11-40). But if the Paralipomena has a not 
secondary influence on Descartes, Descartes itself radicalizes Kepler’s approach by going 
beyond. He develops the process of cognitive determination of geometry and its 
foundation by the cogito. He also makes explicit how deep but still incomplete is the 
process of sublimation of the first mathematical approach developed by perspective. It 
still remains incomplete precisely because the possibility of inscription of the infinity in 
the geometry of vision cannot be made clear. The inscription of infinity into the space, 
made by the technique of perspective cannot remain a stable element for science and 
knowledge, if it is not acquired, absorbed, by thought.  
The complexity of Descartes’ Discourse lies prominently in the search of such 
implementation of geometry – of the Dioptrics as new perspectival geometry of vision – 
to natural sciences. But such implementation requires a further condition: the 
awareness that such implementation is impossible without a metaphysical (i.e. ultimate) 
foundation. The relationship between the Discourse and the three essays (and the 
Dioptric in particular) is naturally not occasional at all. It shows first and foremost the 
anthropological and metaphysical distance of Descartes from the optics of the 
Renaissance. Precisely this distance makes it possible to transfigure Perspective into 
Perspectivism28. Thanks to the inscription of a “simple” Perspective of vision into 
Perspectivism, Descartes can overcome the entire physiological tradition of theory of 
vision, from Galen to Kepler.  
By such physiological theory of vision, the image prints itself on the crystalline of the 
eye, and will be brought through intentional species to the optical nerve. Descartes 
orients himself to a complete mechanization of vision. Such radical philosophical 
“decision” brings one then to the translation of a fully mechanized vision – and of 
mechanics itself – to the metaphysics of the ego. The man – then the ego – is a 
“spectator mundi”. But such spectator finds his own stability not by the topological 
principles sketched by perspective but by the cogito. The stability of vision, of the 




 See Fichant (1994): 48: «[Descartes] intègre son optique à toute sa philosophie naturelle et plus 
encore […] il fait de sa théorie de la vision l’un des pivots et des fondements de son mécanisme». 
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However the ego alone cannot stabilize such transcendent nature. An ontologically 
grounded mechanics (of vision) can measure only the coefficient of deformation of 
seeing and can grasp the similarity between image and object. But such similarity let the 
world as a whole ontologically undetermined.  
What let us certify that the code of our vision is the only code and not just a code 
among others? What stabilizes the ontological nature of the world, i.e. the egological 
dimension of subjectivism? Only a first philosophy, grounding the ontological-algebraic 
stabilization of the nature, can fully determine the field of vision conceived as 
perspectival openness. But what determines ultimately – in the field of a first philosophy 
– the relation between a perspectival fully mechanized vision and ontology? Kant (2010: 
B 243) would say: «a divinity as mediation» [Gottheit zur Vermittlung]. Precisely that 
divinity firstly appears as infinite power («puissance infinite») and only after as object 
“in idea”29. As Descartes argues very clearly: «Je dis que la notion que j’ai de l’infini est 
en moi avant celle du fini» (Descartes, Lettre à Chanut, AT, X, [1897-1913]: 341). 
In the same letter to Chanut, not by chance, Descartes writes – as an apax 
legomenon – about the infinity of God’s Power in Christian Religion, and expressively 
about the incarnation (Mysterium Incarnationis). That should not mean, that Descartes 
bases his approach to infinity on the tale of annunciation. That shows “only” that in the 
“order of discourse” of the Modern Age, that will be oriented by perspective, the infinity 
of God’s Power firstly will be fixed by perspective itself and only after can it be 
sublimated, by Descartes, into his Onto-theo-logy.  
There are three moments of the “appearance” of God into the narrative context of 
the Meditationes de prima philosophia. Firstly appears the infinity of God’s Power by the 
hypothesis of the creation of mathematical truths («création des vérités éternelles»); 
secondly God appears «sub specie infiniti» (by the idea of the infinite); and thirdly his 
existence will be ontologically proved. On the infinity “in idea” it’s possible to recognize 
a very deep need for Descartes’ metaphysical foundation: every act of seeing cannot be 
ultimately justified by any metaphysics of the cogito. In other words: any metaphysics of 
I-thoughts as self-referred mental states is insufficient. Every act of seeing grounded by 
metaphysics of the cogito can be coherent, but not necessarily “true”.  
Perspective grounds also the essential relation between subject (viewer) and infinity 
as gnoseological asymptote of every exploration of science (in Bacon’s image): two 
examples of it are the Damon of Laplace and the “omnimoda determinatio” by Kant. In 
 
29
 See Marion (1981): 261: «Ce mésusage du code, qui rend compte des “erreurs des sens”, se 
radicalisera, dans la Première Méditation, avec l’argument du Malin Génie». 
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the distance opened by such relation – that is a dynamic but topologically invariant 
relation – appears something new: it’s the fundamental concept of every ontological, 
anthropological and socio-political conception of the Modern Age. Such concept is the 
representation [repraesentatio, Vorstellung]. Coming back to Heidegger, such a 
“representing” [vor-stellen] here means:  
to bring the present-at-hand before one as something standing over-and-against, to relate it 
to oneself, the representer, and, in this relation, to force it back to oneself as the norm-
giving domain. […] And what goes along with this is that man set himself forth as the scene 
in which, henceforth, beings must-set-themselves-before, present themselves – be, that is to 
say, [in the] Picture. Man becomes the representative [Repräsentant] of beings in the sense 
of the objective. 
Only in this way: 
now for the first time there exists such a thing as the “position” of man. Man makes depend 
on himself the way he is to stand to beings as objective. (Heidegger [2002]: 68-69) 
We could add: only the man decides which vanishing point of his perspective he will fix 
as the goal of his activity, of his construction, of his exploration. But by such autonomous 
decision the man not only accepts, but realizes the perspectival relation between subject 
and infinity. Infinity means here the teleological terminus of every activity as perspectival 
invariant structure. Only in this way the construction of his logical-scientific as well as 
social or political World-Picture can be thought as free, safe, from every catastrophe (See 
Menissier [2010]: 187-216). Between that perspectival vanishing point and the position 
(or rather the situation) of the subject lies a transparent and diaphanous space. Such 
space can be determined independently from every metaphysical order or hierarchy: 
The words “place” and “space” signify nothing really different from body which is said to be 
in place, but merely designate its magnitude, figure, and situation among other bodies. 
Descartes concludes:  
But if at length we are persuaded that there are no points really immovable in the universe, 
as will hereafter be shown to be probable, we will thence conclude that nothing has a per-
manent place unless in so far as it is fixed by our thought. (Descartes, Principia philosophiae, 
AT VIII, II, § 13; translation mine) 
The fixed point lies in thought, but it’s also the thought itself, that can only stay in 
relation with the other point as infinity. Even when Descartes’ Metaphysics will be 
enlarged by a multi-perspectival Dimension (i.e. by Leibniz), the relation between both 
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points still remains the same (the subject as finite and God as infinite monad)30.  
The multi-perspectival universe of Leibniz, conceived “ad maiorem dei Gloriam”, links 
the individuality of our lived experience with the objective reality of the world. Such 
harmony encompasses every modality of representation (see Busche [1997]: XVII). 
Leibniz tries to enlarge his form of Perspectivism by Monadology, that determines the 
perspectival view as situation of every living experience of the world, i.e. of every finite 
monad. It can be possible only because every lived experience, as perspectival view, is a 
representation. 
Perspectivism is so strong, so deeply rooted in the order of discourse of the Modern 
Age, that it can determine the idea itself of space and spatiality. Such strong 
Perspectivism presupposes that every situation is linked with a “situs” without 
qualitative distinction. 
It’s possible then that such strongly constituted Perspectivism can remain invariant 
even if its metaphysical presupposition will be denied, as by Kant. According to Kant, 
there is no more an infinity of God, no divinity for mediation as ultimate foundation of 
every theoretical and practical activity, but only a teleological point as vanishing point of 
every human perspective (see Kant [2010]: B 429). Only in such perspectival space can 
human reason orient itself.  
What perspective forms and structures is the sense of a human position (and 
condition) in the world. But such situation can be only understood as a “being-in-a-
space”, not in a natural place, or as a “self-orienting-in-a-space”. But what is crucial here 
is precisely the exhaustion of reality in the conception itself of such space: reality loses 
every possibility of opposition to human activity (from a theoretical as well as from a 
practical point of view). It is matter of a reality without any character of friction, of a 
“World-in-Image” or “imaged world”, that cannot resists the human activity31. 
 
30
 Leibniz (2014): § 57: «And just as the same town when seen from different sides will seem 
quite different - as though it were multiplied perspectivally – the same thing happens here: 
because of the infinite multitude of simple substances it is as if there were that many different 
universes; but they are all perspectives on the same one, differing according to the different 
points of view of each monad». 
31
 See for example Blumenberg (1980): 16. One could ask: if Perspective structured the spatiality 
of Modern Age and also its formal idea of time, what constitutes properly the pragmatic 
temporality of human production, i.e. the temporality of its evolution? A possible answer, 
opening, of its side, new horizons in the field of history of science, can be: Alchemy. See Eliade 
(1953: 205, 208): «Alchemy pursues the very old dream of homo faber and realizes it. It is the 
dream of working to the perfection of matter in order to become perfection. […] The 
representation of the alchemist transformation is the mythic coronation of the Trust in the 
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The problem is now: now, when such a human project experienced its radical failure 
(from a theoretical as well as from a socio-political point of view), when the possibility of 
such a World-Picture will be broken into a kaleidoscopic set of partial representations, 
what remains of such World-Picture? What is the Form that we can give to the human 
situation or human condition when the phenomenal world multiplies itself in a 
multidimensional space? What is the situation of thinking in such multidimensional 
reality? A new way, in order to think of reality as well as our knowledge or our practice 
beyond that metaphysical Perspectivism (as ego-onto-logical structure), is suggested by 
Merleau-Ponty, in The Visible and the Invisible. It’s matter of a space that is no more the 
space of perspective but a n-dimensional topological space: 
Ontology – October, 1959 
Take topological space as a model of being. The Euclidean space is the model for perspectival 
being, it is a space without transcendence, positive, a network of straight lines, parallel 
among themselves or perpendicular according to the three dimensions, which sustains all 
the possible situations – Underlying appropriateness of this idea of space (and of velocity, 
movement, time) with the classical ontology of the ens realissimums, of the infinite entity. 
The topological space, on the contrary, a milieu in which are circumscribed relation of 
proximity, of envelopment, etc. is the image of a being that, like Klee’s touches of color, is at 
the same time older than everything and “of the first day” (Hegel), that the regressive 
thought runs up against without being able to deduce it directly or indirectly (by “choice of 
the best”) from Being by itself, that is a perpetual residue – It is encountered not only at the 
level of the physical world, but again it is constitutive of life, and finally it founds the wild 
principle of Logos […]. (Merleau-Ponty [1968]: 211) 
Maybe, at this point, where Perspectivism failed, where that World-Picture imploded 
under the action of our extremely or too massive projecting, a new dimension of 
thinking arises. This new dimension appears as openness of a human situation that we 
define as Multiversum. For such form of “situation”, other forms of art and of geometry 
are arising.  
Captions 
[Fig. 1] Ambrogio Lorenzetti, Annunciazione, 1344, Siena, Pinacoteca Nazionale 
[Fig. 2] Gentile da Fabriano, Annunciazione, 1423-1425 ca., Città del Vaticano, Pinacote-
ca Vaticana 
[Fig. 3] Carlo Crivelli, Annunciazione con Sant’Emidio, 1486, Londra, National Gallery 
 
possibility of the transformation of Nature by human work». 
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[Fig. 4] Simone Martini, Annunciazione tra i santi Ansano e Margherita, 1333, Firenze, 
Galleria degli Uffizi 
[Fig. 5] Piero della Francesca, Polittico di Sant’Antonio, 1460-1470, Perugia, Galleria Na-
zionale dell’Umbria 
[Fig. 6] Piero della Francesca, Pala di Brera (Sacra Conversazione con la Madonna col 
Bambino, sei santi, quattro angeli e il donatore Federico da Montefeltro), 1472, Mila-
no, Pinacoteca di Brera 
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